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THE AUTONOMY OF LAW IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS
CASS P, SUNSTEIN*
I provide these remarks in the context of two personal
observations. As you may know, at the University of Chicago, the
economists and the lawyers interact frequently. I have noted that
these highly intelligent economists contribute, much in their
field, but when they talk about law it is apparent that something
has gone wrong. They do not clearly understand the legal field,
and there is even a question of what it is about the field that they
do not understand.
The second observation occurred longer ago, when I was a law
student in contracts class. I had a very dazzling socratic teacher
who exposed us to a lot of analogical reasoning. As he went from
case to case, we students were confused and amazed. We did not
think that we understood anything, but nonetheless we thought
it was really fantastic. But shortly thereafter we discovered that
we really could not recover much that we had learned from the
class. It was, in its way, a dazzling class, but there were no criteria
by which we could decide whether our judgments were right or
wrong. The instructor had not introduced any, and we never
learned any. What was there that we could use?
My claims here are three, and they are simple.
The first is that the enormous contribution of the economic
analysis of law is that it orders debates about law by simply asking
how we can minimize the costs of decision and the costs of
error. My simple suggestion is that many legal debates turn on
the issue of minimizing the costs of decision and the costs of
error. With that simple insight we can bring order and structure
to debates whose content may be otherwise mysterious.
My second and third points describe ways in which law has a
claim to autonomy.
* Karl N. Liewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, University of
Chicago Law School.
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The second claim focuses on incompletely theorized
arguments. Law often tries to get agreement on particulars from
people who disagree about abstractions. The autonomy of lav
often lies in incompletely theorized agreements on particular
points amidst diversity of opinion on abstract concepts. In a
family, a workplace, a court, or a nation, people often disagree
on first principles, whether they are utilitarians or Kantians or
democrats. Though they may disagree very sharply, they might
still be able to agree that a speed limit law makes perfect sense,
or that the basic rules of negligence are quite plausible. Take
another example. There is a law school in the United States that
was doing quite well in hiring new faculty. By and large, it
handled each particular case well. But then there came a
decision in which issues of diversity had to be brought out for
theoretical agreement. At that point, the law school stopped
working well. People who had agreed on particulars could not
agree on the abstractions underlying those particulars. My
submission is that the autonomy of law often lies in
simultaneous agreement on particulars amidst disagreement
about abstractions.
My third claim is that sometimes cost-benefit analysis itself
may fail cost-benefit analysis because it does not minimize the
sum of decision costs and error costs. Often law makes a kind of
second order, or meta-decision, to truncate the sorts of
considerations to which participants in law may look. The
autonomy of law is best understood as reflecting the second-
order decision that particular people occupying certain
institutional roles should look at some select considerations and
not at others. For example, judges, in deciding what the
Occupational Safety and Health Act means, are not to make a
decision about what the Occupational Safety and Health Act
ought to mean.' Often in ordinary life and in law there is a
second-order decision to say-that certain considerations are
blocked-they are just not admissible on the agenda. You might
think, for example, that you are not allowed to gossip about
1. See; e.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 720 (1962) (ClarkJ., dissenting) ("Our
province is to decide what the law is, not to declare what it should be .... If the law is
wrong, it ought to be changed; but the power for that is not with us.") (omission in
original) (quoting Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875)); Taylor v.
Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 656 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that, in a diversity suit,
the Court of Appeals' inquiry is notwhat the state law ought to be, but ratherwhatit is).
[Vol. 21
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some secret that a close friend told you just because it would be
fun-the second-order consideration blocks that means of
having fun. Law works similarly. The second-order decision itself
has to be justified, but it results in a degree of legal autonomy.
More concretely, consider a case called Chevron. To introduce
the case, I have done a little empirical study of citations to
famous cases. Marbury v. Madison has been cited in federal cases
1,066 times. Brown v. Board of Educatio4 has been cited 1,468
times. Roe v. Wade,5 the key case in a lot of substantive due
process decisions, and the hero and villain in a lot of litigation,
recently surpassed Brown: Roe has been cited 1,476 times-at last
count eight more times than Brown. Chevron, decided in 1984,
has had a significantly shorter amount of time to accumulate
citations, yet it has been cited 3,627 times, and before long it
may exceed Marbury, Brown, and Roe combined.
Chevron basically holds that when a statute is ambiguous, the
court ought to accept the agency's interpretation so long as it is
reasonable.6 Chevron holds that a court ought not to ask if the
agency's interpretation is correct (as Marbury might suggest the
court should do7), but instead the court should ask if the
agency's interpretation of law is reasonable (so long as the
statute has ambiguity in it)." Chevron is a kind of counter-Marb uy
for the regulatory state.
We might ask, in thinking about the autonomy of law, what is
the origin of the analysis in Chevron? I think the analysis
proceeds relatively simply. The first question on which people
have broad agreement is that the appropriate posture of a court
reviewing an agency interpretation of law depends in the first
instance on what Congress wants. That is, if .Congress wants
courts to defer to agency interpretations of law, then courts
ought to defer to agency interpretations of law. If not, then
courts ought not to defer to such interpretations.
2. Chevron, U.S.A,. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
3. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
4. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
6. See Chezmm, 467 U.S. at 843-44.
7. See Marbuy, 5 U.S. 137,177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to saywhat the law is.").
8. See Chewon, 467 U.S. at 84344.
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In the first instance, this is a question of congressional
instructions. Note, interestingly, that the proposition itself is
incompletely theorized. That is, people who agree that the
question of whether agencies deserve deference in their
interpretations of law is a question for Congress to answer hold
that opinion for diverse reasons. Some would offer economic
justifications pointing to Marbury v. Madison. Others would offer
non-economic justifications also pointing to Marbuiy v. Madison.
The proposition is, itself, incompletely theorized.
If we look at Congress's instructions on whether courts should
defer to agency interpretations of law, we will find some
ambiguity. Congress has not spoken with clarity to that general
issue. In the most powerful justification for the Chevron decision,
Justice Scalia has basically argued that if we want to minimize
the costs of decision and the costs of error, Chevron does better
than anything else.9 It introduces a high degree of simplicity and
uniformity into the law. It produces a rule against which courts
and Congress can act. It allows for congressional correction with
relative clarity about the background against which corrections
will take place. Overall, it reduces error as well as any
alternative. Often the resolution of ambiguities calls for a policy
judgment. Often Congress and courts are in a worse position
than agencies in resolving those ambiguities. If we want to
reduce mistakes, this is no worse than any other way, and if we
want to reduce decision costs, it is better.
The debate over Chevron is very elaborate and extensive.
There are many thousands of pages on the issue." Despite the
9. SeeAntonin ScaliaJudicialDeference tofAdministrative Interpretations ofLaw, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 517 (noting that administrative errors in statutory interpretation can be more
readily remedied thanjudicial errors).
10. See Smiley v. Citibank, 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (1996) ("We accord deference to
agencies under Chevron, not because of a presumption that they drafted the provisions In
question, or were present at the hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but rather
because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for
implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first
and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.").
11. For a sample of the scholarly discussion on Chevron, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Updating Statuto3yInterpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); Harold H. Bmff, Coordinating
JudicialReview in AdministrativeLan, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1193 (1992); Maureen B. Callahan,
Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?: A New Doctrinal Basis for
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 1275 (1991);
Iinda R. Hirshman, Postmodern Jurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82
Nw. U. L REV. 646 (1988); Dan M. 1ahan, Is Chevron Reeuant to Federal Criminal Law?,
110 HARV. L REV. 469 (1996); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial
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diversity of arguments for and against Chevron, they are debates
on the grounds not far from those identified by Justice Scalia-
what rule will most reduce the costs of decision and the costs of
error? Current debates on the scope of Chevron focus on very
similar issues. These are debates that have a degree of
technicality, but they raise large questions about the nature of
separation of powers and constitutional government. There are
debates about the role of legislative history and of statutory text
in statutory interpretation. Suppose an agency wants to go
against the legislative history or wants to buck the statutory text.
Debates in such a case are about the degree of decisional
simplicity that can be produced by one rule or another and the
best way to reduce error.
Let me conclude with just a few notations. Plainly Judge
Easterbrook is correct in saying that law is not autonomous in
the sense that any legal doctrine ultimately needs a defense in
non-legal terms1 A defense of law in purely legal terms would
be circular, and therefore we need to look outside of law for a
defense. The kind of core, simple insight of the economic
analysis of law-indispensable, I think, to the practice of law in
the Twenty-first Century-is that we can organize a lot of our
otherwise unruly debates by suggesting that they are really
debates about how to minimize decision costs and error costs.
However, it is not as if this were a magic algorithm that can solve
our problems. The identification of what counts as an error may
well become contentious, but a lot of debates become much
simpler once we see them through the law and economics lens
because we can identify our exact point of disagreement.
Sometimes the effort to reduce decision costs and error costs
pushes courts toward a degree of autonomy for law. Sometimes
the effort to reduce the sum of decision costs and error costs
produces autonomous law embodied in the notion that cost-
benefit analysis sometimes fails cost-benefit analysis. Consider
analogical reasoning, principles of deference to other
institutional actors, and principles excluding certain reasons for
Dtference to Agency Intepretations ofAgency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Political Control Veus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons firm
Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481 (1990); RichardJ. PierceJr., 77 Rote of
Constitutional and Political ThAeoy in Administrative Law, 64 TEx. L RV. 469 (1985); Cass R.
Sunstein, Law andAdministration ajLer Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071 (1990).
12. Judge Easterbrook raised this point at The Sixteenth Annual National Student
Federalist Society Symposium on Law and Public Policy (1997).
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action that would be admissible in other circumstances.' These
various practices produce a degree of autonomy for law. They
need a second order or metajustification which may be either in
economic or non-economic terms. It makes legal judgment
independent of moral or political or economic judgment for
moral, political, or economic reasons.
Finally, a clue to the autonomy of law lies in the fact that often
people from diverse theoretical perspectives can converge in a
kind of incompletely theorized way on particular agreements
about what to do. People who often disagree about exactly what
to say can often agree on what ought to be done. Let me
conclude with the suggestion that a key to the autonomy of legal
reasoning and a key to social stability in a pluralistic society lies
in the phenomenon of incompletely theorized agreements.
13. One such principle is the idea that the offensiveness of ideas is never a legitimate
reason to regulate speech.
(Vol. 21
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